Sign-in strength for your apps
How Scrydon applies your organization's sign-in requirement to the apps it signs users in to, how an app asks for a stronger sign-in, and what the acr and amr claims in an ID token mean.
When Scrydon signs a user in to one of your organization's apps, it applies the same sign-in requirement it applies inside Scrydon. A user whose session is weaker than your organization requires is asked to confirm their sign-in before the app receives anything.
Your organization's requirement applies to its apps
Organization administrators set the requirement under Settings → Governance → Identity. It has three levels:
| Level | A session meets it when the user signed in with |
|---|---|
| Off | any method |
| Two factors | a password and an authenticator code or recovery code, or a passkey |
| Phishing-resistant only | a passkey |
An app registered by your organization gets an authorization code only for a session that meets the level. A weaker session is sent to a page titled This organization needs a stronger sign-in. The user confirms with a passkey, or signs out and signs in again with a stronger method. Scrydon then resumes the app's original request.
A user with neither a passkey nor an authenticator app selects Set up a passkey or authenticator on that page. Their account security settings open in a new tab, so the page keeps the app's request. After adding a passkey they return to the page and confirm with it.
When the app asked with prompt=none, there is no page to show. The app
receives the interaction_required error instead and should retry without
prompt=none.
Asking for a level from your app
An app can ask for a level in the authorization request, with acr_values or
with an acr entry in the claims request parameter. Scrydon treats either
as required. Your organization's requirement is checked first, so an app can
never ask its way below it.
GET /api/auth/oauth2/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=...&scope=openid
&acr_values=http://eidas.europa.eu/LoA/substantialThe values Scrydon accepts are listed in discovery, under
acr_values_supported:
| Value | Needs |
|---|---|
urn:scrydon:acr:single_factor | any method |
urn:scrydon:acr:two_factor | two factors |
urn:scrydon:acr:phishing_resistant | a passkey |
http://idmanagement.gov/ns/assurance/aal/1 | any method (NIST AAL1) |
http://idmanagement.gov/ns/assurance/aal/2 | two factors (NIST AAL2) |
http://idmanagement.gov/ns/assurance/aal/2?phishing_resistant=true | a passkey |
http://eidas.europa.eu/LoA/low | any method |
http://eidas.europa.eu/LoA/substantial | two factors |
A value missing from this list cannot be met. eIDAS high and NIST AAL3 are
two examples. If every value an app asks for is one Scrydon cannot meet, the
app receives unmet_authentication_requirements and no code. Scrydon does not
answer with a weaker level, because an app that names a level relies on it.
eIDAS levels describe how a person's identity was checked as well as how they signed in. Scrydon vouches for the sign-in only. A passkey that syncs between devices is not a hardware-bound key, so Scrydon never asserts NIST AAL3.
What the ID token says
Every ID token carries an acr claim. It is the first value the app asked for
that the session meets. When the app asked for none, it is the Scrydon value
for the session's level.
The amr claim lists how the session was authenticated, using the values from
RFC 8176:
| Sign-in | amr |
|---|---|
| Password | ["pwd"] |
| Password and authenticator code, or recovery code | ["pwd", "otp", "mfa"] |
| Passkey | ["swk", "user", "mfa"] |
| Magic link or email code | ["otp"] |
Tokens refreshed later keep the level of the session they were first issued
under. A session signed in through your organization's own external identity
provider carries no amr claim yet.
Read these claims from the validated ID token. Never read them from the authorization response or from a query parameter.