Client Addresses
How Scrydon decides which address a request came from, the one Helm value that controls it, and how to move webhook allowlists to it safely.
Every place Scrydon records or checks a caller's address uses the same rule. That covers sign-in rate limits, the Audit Log, sessions, webhook and interface IP allowlists and rate limits, and webhook delivery records.
The rule
Scrydon reads X-Forwarded-For from the right. Each hop inside
auth.trustedProxyCidrs is one of your own proxies and is skipped. The first
hop outside it is the caller. Scrydon never reads what is to its left, because
the client wrote that. It never reads X-Real-IP.
If every hop is trusted, or a hop is not an address, the caller is unknown. An unknown caller shares one rate-limit bucket and never passes an IP allowlist.
Configure it
auth:
# Default: every private range. Right when your clients are on the internet.
trustedProxyCidrs: "10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16,127.0.0.0/8,fc00::/7,fe80::/10,::1/128"The chart passes this value to every service that resolves a caller.
Clients on a private network (on-premises)? With the default list, Scrydon
also skips your clients' own addresses, so a client can choose the address it
is recorded under. List the exact addresses of your proxy hops instead (the
ingress pods and the load balancer). Use "" only when you do not know them.
Scrydon then believes only a single-value header, and behind a proxy all
callers share one rate-limit bucket.
The ingress must also keep the client's source address (for Traefik,
service.spec.externalTrafficPolicy: Local). See TLS Offloading.
Webhook allowlists
Webhook and interface allowlists use this same rule. X-Real-IP is never
read, so a sender cannot claim an allowlisted address by setting it.
An allowlist entry that holds one of your proxy addresses matches nobody: the rule skips trusted proxies to find the sender. List the senders' own public addresses instead. If you upgrade from a version before this rule, replace any such entry before upgrading. The previous rule let such an entry admit every sender behind that proxy.
Certificate sign-in behind a proxy
Certificate sign-in normally needs TLS passthrough to the certificate host. If a proxy you run terminates the client's TLS, it can forward the certificate instead:
auth:
certificateSignIn:
forwardedCertificate:
enabled: true
header: client-cert # RFC 9440; intermediates in client-cert-chain
proxyCidrs: "10.20.0.14" # the proxy's own addresses: requiredScrydon believes the header only from a connection that comes from an address in
proxyCidrs. It refuses a header from anywhere else, and a malformed one, and
records both in the Audit Log. Keep proxyCidrs to the proxy's addresses and
never a whole private range: anything in it can sign in with any certificate it
writes. The proxy must remove any Client-Cert and Client-Cert-Chain header the
client sent, and must set X-Forwarded-For.