Network boundary

How Scrydon limits the network — egress policy, ingress termination, and the cluster perimeter.

Scrydon's network model is shaped by one principle: the customer cluster is the trust boundary. Everything inside it is enforced by mTLS and capability checks; everything outside is treated as untrusted.

Inbound

Inbound traffic terminates at Traefik. Three classes of routes:

Route class	Authenticated as	Where
User-facing app	User session (SSO + Better Auth)	Workflow editor, settings, chat, voice
Workflow API	API key (workflow-scoped)	`POST /api/workflows/{id}/execute`
Public assets	None	`/favicon.ico`, `/health` (liveness/readiness only)

There are no public endpoints that expose customer data. The /health endpoint returns only platform liveness — it does not leak version, configuration, or tenant data.

See Ingress hardening for the header-stripping and TLS-termination rules.

Outbound

Outbound traffic falls into three buckets:

Bucket	Required?	Where
License heartbeat	Yes, for licensed operation	`license.scrydon.com` — daily POST, 30-day grace window
Vendor calls	Opt-in per integration	The endpoints declared by installed integrations (OpenAI, Microsoft Graph, etc.)
Copilot Backend	Required only if Copilot is used	`copilot.scrydon.com` — orchestration for the in-editor assistant

Nothing else leaves the cluster. No telemetry, no error reporting to Scrydon, no anonymous analytics. If your security policy requires a tightly scoped egress allowlist, the three endpoints above plus whatever installed integrations call are the entire list.

Air-gapped mode

In true air-gapped deployments, you can:

Operate offline-only: skip the license heartbeat. Operations continue under your contractual licence; phone-home is disabled.
Skip Copilot: the in-editor assistant becomes unavailable. The rest of the platform is unaffected.
Lock vendor integrations to self-hosted providers only. No outbound vendor calls happen.

See Deployment → Air-gapped for the full procedure.

Egress allowlist

For non-air-gapped deployments, the recommended egress policy is:

ALLOW  license.scrydon.com:443                # required
ALLOW  copilot.scrydon.com:443                # optional (Copilot)
ALLOW  <endpoints declared by installed integrations>
DENY   *                                       # everything else

The platform never makes outbound calls to anything not in that list. The list is auditable from Settings → Platform → Integrations (each installed integration lists its declared egress endpoints).

A vendor's declared egress endpoints are part of the integration manifest, validated at install time, and rejected if they would expand the egress surface beyond the org's configured allowlist.

Per-tool SSRF protection

Web-fetch and tool-driven outbound calls are subject to a runtime SSRF check:

RFC 1918 (private) addresses are denied.
Link-local (169.254.0.0/16) is denied.
IPv6 unique-local (fc00::/7) is denied.
Loopback is denied.
Cluster-internal hostnames (*.svc.cluster.local) are denied.

This applies to the built-in fetch-webpage tool, the API block, and any vendor tool that performs an outbound fetch on user-controlled input. Integration authors cannot bypass this check; the platform enforces it on every dispatch.

Ingress hardening — the inbound side of the boundary.
SPIFFE / mTLS — internal mesh authentication.
Deployment → Air-gapped — full disconnect mode.